Communication and Consciousness in the Pragmatist Critique of Representation by Pires, Edmundo Balsemão
 
European Journal of Pragmatism and
American Philosophy 
III-1 | 2011
Contemporary Reassessment of William James a
Century Later
Communication and Consciousness in the
Pragmatist Critique of Representation










Edmundo Balsemão Pires, « Communication and Consciousness in the Pragmatist Critique of
Representation », European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], III-1 | 2011, Online
since 01 July 2011, connection on 19 April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/864  ;
DOI : 10.4000/ejpap.864 
This text was automatically generated on 19 April 2019.
Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right
of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Communication and Consciousness
in the Pragmatist Critique of
Representation




1 In many writings, W. James criticized the concept of a double of the object in the mind as a
wrong  perspective  about  the  mental  activity  involved  in  the  construction  of  the
experience, a mistaken conception on the balance of the conscious and the unconscious
aspects  of  the  knowing  process  and,  generally  speaking,  a  misconception  of  the
importance of the imaginative projections along the temporal emergence of the “actual”
perception.  His  criticism applies  also  to  the conventional  Realist  doctrines  or  to  the
modern theories of the perception as a mirror of the external being. But he didn’t pay
special attention to the linguistic extension of this “double” in the theory of sign and
proposition of the modern philosophers that were continuing Aristotle.
2 Along Peirce’s discussion of the Metaphysical and Logical significance of the Doctrine of
Categories emerged the idea of a cyclical, sequential and self-catalysed sign-activity or
semeiosis coupled with a much more complex triad of object, mental concept and sign
than supposed in the classical  and modern idea of  representation.  But,  Peirce didn’t
extend his concept of a self-catalysed semeiosis to communication as a system autonomous
from the individual consciousness and to biosemeiosis.
3 Additionally, If Peirce and James agree in the refusal of the conventional theory of re-
presentation as mirror, their rejection came from different horizons and their critiques
don’t mean the same. We will see if their views are convergent.
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II. Consciousness
II.1. The Formation of Meaning in Consciousness
4 The post-kantian Philosophy illustrates a continuous discussion about the meaning of the
representation and the thing-in-itself in relation to the concept of the consciousness as
absolute activity (Fichte) or the consciousness as a source of a subjective self-validating
“certainty” (Hegel).
5 The writing of Kant’s former student in Königsberg J. S. Beck, Erläuternder Auszug aus den
critischen Schriften des Herrn Prof. Kant (Riga, 1793), includes a critique of the postulation of
the thing-in-itself beyond the representation. According to J. S. Beck representations are
the  primitive  source  of  knowledge  in  the  consciousness  and  possibly  its  unique
searchable source. The admission of the thing-in-itself transcending the representations
would  entail  an  avoidable  concession  to  the  dogmatic  method  in  Philosophy,
contradicting the spirit of the Kantian Philosophy.
6 Later,  C. Renouvier  began  in  his  Essais  de  Critique  Générale  (first  edition  1854)  a
philosophical programme ambitioning the rebuilding on new foundations of the critical
Philosophy. He kept the essential traits of his earlier efforts in Le Personnalisme, suivi d’une
Étude sur la Perception externe et sur la force (1903) where one finds chapters especially
concerned with James’s Philosophy of Perception and Will.1
7 Trying to preserve those Kantian conceptions akin to the positivistic imperative of the
knowledge within the limits of “facts,” one of the original contributions of the Essais is
the refutation of Kant’s dualism of the thing-in-itself and the phenomena. According to
C. Renouvier Kant’s dualistic thought remains uncritical and metaphysical and compels
the philosopher to forge idola such as the noumenom.  The objections regarding Kant’s
doctrine led to a sharp scrutiny of the concept of representation and to a refusal of the
mirror version of the representation and Knowledge. The first division of his first Essai 
deals with the concept of representation (De la Repésentation en général). To be represented
means simply “to appear.” Appearance is the proper definition of a “representation.”
Thus, this word doesn’t mean re-presentation of a previous thing, but donation of content
in the consciousness. The relation between the representations and the external things is
not clarified. Instead, the author states that in Knowledge the “things” must be referred
only through the “representations.”  This  requires  a precision:  if  we can’t  apprehend
anything outside the content of our consciousness all we need is this content. There is
nothing more to know.
8 Identified with the conscious contents the “things” and the “representations” are the
same.  C. Renouvier  calls  these  primitive  contents  “faits”  or  “phénomènes.”2 The
metaphysical problem of the relation between an “external world” and the conscious
content of the representations ceases.  “What is” is a representation as an irreducible
phenomenon  or  “fact.”  From  these  premises  comes  the need  for  a  new  concept  of
experience.  According  to  the  “new  criticism”  experience  refers  to  the  multiple
connexions  of  the  phenomena  in  a  personal  consciousness.  The  form  of  the
representations and the personal consciousness made a self-sufficient pair that makes
senseless the problem of the access to a transcendent thing-in-itself: “la représentation
n’implique rien qu’elle-même.”3 It is the representation that divides itself in two faces: a
representative and a represented. The idea of a self-division of the representation led to
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the refusal of the comparison of the consciousness with a mirror of the external thing.4
Finally,  comes  the  statement  of  the  identity  between the  thing  and  the  appearance
(phénomène).
9 In 1886, in the Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen,  according to a positivistic mood,
E. Mach refused the thing-in-itself, independent from the impressions and sense-data of
the experience (Merkmalen),  as a sort of “rest” that would subsist as the transcendent
warranty  of  the  continuous  multiplicity  of  the  subjective  impressions.  Against  the
transcendence of a noumenon he declared: “Es ist denn richtig,  dass die Welt nur aus
unsern  Empfindungen  besteht.”5 In  the  formation  of  the  impressions  one  needs  to
describe the association between the states of consciousness and the space-time situation
of the organic body. But from this relation it is not valid to conclude that there is an
external independent support of the plurality of the impressions.
10 On  the  other  hand,  at  the  middle  and  final  stages  of  the  post-kantian  period,
A. Schopenhauer and F. Nietzsche prepared the conditions for a subjective genealogy of
the thing-in-itself through its reduction to the human Will.
11 It  is  not  incidental  the  inclusion  of  a  Lecture  on  “Bergson  and  his  Critique  of
Intellectualism” (Lecture VI) in James’s Hibbert Lectures – A Pluralistic Universe.6 In the
writings  of  the  French  philosopher  James  could  find  a  metaphysical  proof  of  the
distinction  of  the  psychic  systems  towards  the  physical  and  the  biological,  in  the
difference  between  the  conscious,  the  organic  and  the  inert  realms.  However,  this
distinction leads to the need for elucidation of the nature of the causation between the
three  levels.  H. Bergson  was  very  sceptical  regarding  the  idea  of  a  direct  cerebral
causation of the consciousness.7 His observations on the difference between the brain of
the animals and the human brain made obvious that the human brain is structured in
such a complex way that it  liberates the superior form of consciousness one finds in
humans. The complexity of the organization of matter in the living organisms establishes
not only complex forms of life and consciousness, but the autonomy of consciousness
properly  speaking.  L’Évolution  Créatrice  develops  the  connexion  of  the  brain  to  the
consciousness as an association between different orders of complexity that are mutually
adapted in the universal process of Life. The mutual adaptation is possible because the
Human brain doesn’t dictate nothing qualitatively determined, but a certain number of
possible  combinations  which  the  consciousness  actualizes  in  a  qualitative  domain
characterised by a permanent modal change of the actual in the potential and vice-versa.
In the inner durée consciousness keeps the essential fluidity typical of all  the organic
structures in opposition to the inorganic matter and only along the stream of the psychic
time the consciousness is close to itself. The knowing process emerges along the stream
of time and consciousness Bergson called durée. This version of the cognitive process is
very different from the intellectualist doctrine of representation that Bergson criticizes.
12 W. James refused the traditional theory of representation and along the section I of the
Essays in Radical Empiricism he tried to develop his own version of the inner intentionality
of consciousness. According to his version, the continuity of the experience is something
that is achieved inside a series of connected moments of an unbroken stream of thought
from a beginning point until a result. In such stream what is called the object or meaning
is the result of this continuous, conjunctive, sequence of thinking. What compels to a
relative pause of the thinking process,  as its teleological  orientation,  is  the cognitive
interest of the cognisor and the action he associates to the particular sequences of the
stream.  Thus,  what  one  calls  the  object  is  given  in  the  immanent  process  of  the
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continuous thinking as its (relative) teleological conclusion or terminus. The subject can
give an account of such internal oriented procession until the meaning or object. But it is
not possible to establish a correspondence part-to-part or point-to-point between the
object of consciousness and the exterior thing. This means that the whitness of the inner
connectivity of the thinking process doesn’t give a precise picture of the whitness of the
transcendent relations in what occurs in the physical world. The true experience is self-
sufficient  regarding  its  inner  teleological  tendency  towards  the  meaning  or  object:
“experience  and  reality  come  to  the  same  thing.”8 James  criticized  both  the
“representationalists”  and  F. H. Bradley  because  especially  this  one  “derealized”  the
experience.9 His critic of the “absolutists” focused F. H. Bradley’s Appearance and Reality as
the direct target,  and indirectly Hegel.  I  will  not scrutinize here the accuracy of  the
indirect critiques against Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and Logic.
13 Let me go to the critique of “representationalism.”
14 If the body, as “my body,” is the “objective nucleus of every man’s experience”10 and if it
remains in continuity with the psychic experience, in such a way that one may include
the organic body in the erection of the self, the same doesn’t happen with the physical
reality in the primary sense of the concept. This means that around the same physical,
exterior, reality a great variety of psychic processes may start, because the association to
it is discontinuous and not exclusive of a singular thinker.
15 Experience is not based on representations if with the word “representation” one means
a double of the original physical thing in the mind. The same applies to fictive substitutes
of the physical thing. However, in the stream of thoughts it is possible to identify psychic
processes where short thoughts, or concepts and ideas, operate by substitution of other
more complex thoughts.  But  the value of  this  substitution is  to  be evaluated always
regarding its function in the particular stream as a temporal continuous and not as tool
to get out from the stream.
16 The transitions and conditional ends are the unique elements to be taken as real parts of
a course of experience and substitutions are aspects in the transitions. Nothing in this
field is able to operate definitely as a substitute for a physical thing or for an alien course
of experience, because one can’t abstract from the singular combination of possibilities
that made the actual stream of thought possible which is individual, hic et nunc, and not
repeatable. The equivalent of a “whole system of experiences” would be a “quasi-chaos”
made by an indefinite combination of possibilities of stream paths and not an order.11
17 In  the  Principles  of  Psychology  W. James  continues  the  refutation  of  the  metaphysical
dualism of the thing-in-itself and its image in the mind supporting the thesis that every
object  of  the type of  a  thought-correlate  is  identical  to  what  is  presented along the
personal  consciousness  stream.  The  fiction  of  a  point-to-point  correspondence  of  a
thought-correlate  and  an  exterior  substance  is  a  prejudice  rooted  in  grammatical
fetishism.12
18 From the point of view of the jamesian Psychology grounded on the idea of homogeneity,
continuity and indivisibility of the stream of thought it is expectable a critique of the
psychological  atomism of  modern Philosophy (Hobbes,  Locke  and Hume).  But  in  the
constitution of its concept of the psychic representation, the atomistic reconstruction of
thought and knowledge started from the postulate of the external thing with qualities
figured in the mind through a physical-psychical causation.13
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19 The psychological atomism brings together the parts of the mental object in order to
show that those aspects were in the external physical object as the cause of the mental
image.  According  to  the  description,  a  representation  means  a  mental  effect  of  an
external cause through sensations and associations of sensations.
20 W. James remarks that this model takes the thought about the thing as equivalent to the
objective discourse about the thing. The belief in the physical-psychical causation led to
the suggestion of a previous unity in the external thing instead of the assumption of the
homogeneity of the stream of thought. The causal model ignores that the time of the
consciousness is not point-to-point identical with an objective chronology with its own
parts or identical with the time of the discourse.14
21 Another consequence of the prestige of the atomistic Psychology was the description of
the psychological objects as representations perfectly defined and separated from other
representations  equally  distinct.  However,  a  serious  examination  of  the  psychic
enchainment  shows  that  the  distinct  impressions  are  always  referred  to  a  halo  or
penumbra enveloping the psychic life.15
22 There is  a  corporeal,  neural  ground for this  permanent shifting movement from the
penumbra to the vivid impression along the stream. The neural transmission takes its
own duration and its psychic effects are not comparable to discrete pulses.  W. James
distinguished the “brain dying vibrations” from the “brain vivid vibrations.” Pauses in
the neural vibration convert in memory marks and fictive substitutes. The cover of the
pauses  with  the  help  of  ficta  is  also  a  condition  for  the  internal  continuity  of  the
consciousness. One may describe stream segments ordered around identity and relative
durableness and other segments responsible for freshness.16 The resting-phases are like
the “substantive parts” of the stream; the flux-phases “transitive parts.” Thus, vagueness
is a constitutive trait of the mental phenomena.
23 The difference between the “substantive” and the “transitive” is due to the selective
orientation of the consciousness towards its elements. It is apparently inconsequential to
say that consciousness is selective, but if one observes better W. James was right when he
extended such appreciation to the operations of the sensorial organs. One of the mental
mechanisms that  reveals  this  selective course is  the attention.  But  selection through
attention is associated with a variety of selective channels for the organization of the
impressions, entailing complex negations, distinctions, abstentions, etc.17
24 Retrieving the problem of the coordination of the stream of consciousness and the world
of the external things, W. James quoted Helmholtz18 to prove that what one calls “things”
are results of impressions fixed through selections which set up clusters of qualities.
These are arranged in such a way that our practical interests and habits  dictate the
relevancies regarding what occurs in the horizon of the mental meaning. Naming and the
formation of judgments are the linguistic processes that follow.
25 The objective reference of a thought (or also, according to W. James, its “meaning”) is not
directly established by an isolated figurative act starting with the physical  thing and
ending in the mind but it is a temporal teleological oriented process towards an end or
final meaning, where it is admissible differences between virtual stages in the formation
of  the  meaning  and  actual,  perceptual stages  that  fulfil  the  requirements  for  the
conclusion of the stream of thought regarding the thing or event. This distinction shall be
emphasized because a great part of our knowledge remains in the virtual stages. From the
impossible  fulfilment  of  all  the  conceptions  of  our  virtual  knowing  follows  that  the
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“pragmatic  method,”  which  is  a  guessing  about  the  practical  consequences  of  our
conceptions, is the best way to certify the correctness of our ideas. But in James’s version,
at the end, this method leads to a relative privilege of the perceptual elements of the
experience regarding the other virtual psychic components. This is mainly due to a shift
from  the  difference  between  vivid/non-vivid,  virtual/actual  and  fictional/perceptual
stages of the stream.
26 What are the criteria for the reaching of meaning? Is it the satisfaction with our picture
of the real as a sort of positive emotional response to it? It coincides with the content of a
“final” percept, as proposed by James? Or it stands for a felicitous momentarily “it fits” in
a running process of adjustments of inner experience and bodily orientation?
27 If we choose the Jamesian answer to the alternatives and the idea of a tendency of the
virtual knowing to the actuality of a percept there is no radical difference between the
“pragmatic maxim” and verificationism that leads to a quasi representationalism. If we
emphasize the value of the temporal drift, or the “in between,” every moment of the
experience is “virtual” and experience is a never ending path towards fulfilment. The
exclamation “it fits” stands for a chance that happens when a selection is made from a
variety of candidates such as a percept, fictional contents or emotions for the completion
of a coherent picture of the stream of thought. It seems that James was not sufficiently
radical to realize that in consciousness there is nothing definitely “actual” or “objective.”
28 Our position regarding James’s idea of virtual and actual (or perceptual) elements of the
stream is  twofold.  Against  James we say that  meaning is  not  coincident with a final
perceptual fulfilment of a flow. We are asserting that in consciousness alone there is no
valid  way  to  distinguish  between  actuality  and  virtuality.  This  distinction  entails
communicative events and not only consciousness contents. With James we agree that in
consciousness meaning emerges from a temporal adjustment, and we add: it is a temporal
adjustment of different elements of the experience in order to get the best layout for a
puzzle, which belongs not to consciousness but to language in the form of propositions.
29 James  declares  that  the  stream  of  consciousness  is  a  continuous  flow  of  elements
connected  together  along  a  nonstop  chain.  But  in  order  to  give  an  account  of  the
objective reference of the thought he acknowledges a relative break in the chain to allow
the formation of the consciousness of identity. However, it seems that he didn’t realize
that with the passage from the continuous flow to the consciousness of identity one is
facing the emergence of a denotative symbolic action, which begins with imagination and
at the end will mobilize names, the relation of names and verbs, or going to the point:
language. From the perspective of consciousness as a nonstop metamorphosis of virtual
and actual elements every meaning-fixation coincides with an interruption or with an
internal reflexive loop.
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Figure 1
30 In the figure above one can visualize the formation of reflexive loops in the immanent
time  entailing  the  internal  reference  to  identity  through  imaginary  formations  and
imaginary time meta-flows (in the discrete lines).
31 In his Essays in Radical Empiricism James passes from the psychic notion of meaning in the
immanence  of  the  teleological  stream  of  thought  to  the  problem  of  the  objective
reference of thought and to the question of the truth. But in such passages James didn’t
acknowledge the use of signs.
 
II.2. The Formation of Meaning in Consciousness
32 All the mental phenomena suppose the identity of appearance and reality. This is a thesis
common  to  the  idealists  and  to  James’s  own  conception.  According  to  James  the
application of the idealist relation of the whole and the parts to the finite consciousness
and to what he calls the super-consciousness has a major negative consequence or is
paradoxical. In chapter III of Appearance and Reality F. H. Bradley started his explanation
of the meaning of relations from the notion of the “given facts” as compounds or units
made by qualities and relations. “Reality” is a composition of these two aspects. He claims
that  the way in which both dimensions  harmonize is  not  immediately  apparent  and
manifest. The conclusion of the argument points to a unifying principle that ties together
relations and qualities: relation presupposes quality, and quality relation.19 It is impossible to
dissolve qualities in relations or vice versa. The qualities must be and also must be related.
This means that qualities are partially made by the relations.20 The connection between a
quality and its relations constitutes a part of what a quality is, even if we know that the
quality is never completely identical with its relational dimension. The part of the quality
which depends on the relation is connected to it by an internal relation. The admission of
internal relations is a consequence of the argument that states that a relation can’t be a
“mere adjective” to the qualities.21 Such outcome also entails the need for an adequate
interpretation of the inherence of relations. Here, the objection can be turned to the
empirical inaccessibility to such internal relations.
33 But James’s critique of the super-consciousness in A Pluralistic Universe is directed towards
both F. H. Bradley’s ideas and J. Royce’s full version of his “fourth conception of Being” in
the Gifford Lectures The World and the Individual  (1899-1900).  The “fourth conception”
states three basic thesis: i) that whatever is has its being only as a fact observed, and exists as
the fulfilment of a conscious meaning;22 ii) the idea that the finite knowers are in reciprocal
relations (in society) which leads to the conclusion that such reciprocal relation exists 
and,  consequently  is  a  fact  and  as  a  fact  must  be  observed  (again)  by  another
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consciousness, different of the first knowers; iii) to avoid a regressum ad infinitum J. Royce
tries to prove that it must be a final knower, which is God identical with the Aristotelian
“absolute self-knowledge,” and concludes that “[…] one final knower knows all knowing
processes in one inclusive act.”23
34 In A Pluralistic Universe James’s argumentation against intellectualism and idealism states
that in the idealistic version of the process of knowledge the finite consciousness relates
to a “super-consciousness” in the same way as a part to its whole. At the same time the
difference of the finite and the super-consciousness is a difference for a consciousness
and in this case for the super-consciousness, which means that the finite consciousness
must be apparent and not real. Because this involves the rejection of the initial identity of
appearance and reality the idealist supposition of a super-consciousness relating to the
finite knowers as the whole to its parts must be false or the idealist thesis inconsistent
and self-contradictory.
35 James’s critique of the idealistic “whole and parts” relation is the ground for his strategic
isolation of the consciousness as a special field, and a new disciplinary subject matter.
36 The  “field  of  consciousness”  can  only  be  fully  acknowledged  under  some  general
epistemological and ontological premises. I will detach four main ideas. i) The field of
consciousness  is  self-sufficient  regarding  what  appears  for  a  consciousness;  ii)  the
admission of this self-sufficiency and the rejection of a super-consciousness as another
level of integrative knowledge of the finite subject entails the absolute individuation of
the consciousness; iii) the ideas of pluralism and multiverse reflect the subtraction of the
finite  consciousness  from its  alleged source  in  the  “absolute”;  and iv)  the  space-time 
identity of the object is not a guaranty of the uniformity of the images of the world.
37 But these obvious consequences from the critical  starting point  against  the monistic
idealism produce the difficult  alternative between a  radical  finite  distribution of  the
“consciousness  field”  and the  admission of  a  unifying  principle.24 Some pages  ahead
James resumes and summarizes this  dilemma in the alternative between the logic of
identity or the irrationality.25
38 His choice will be on the side of the “irrational” character of psychical reality and life. But
in order to make clear his choice he should explain what is “irrational.”
39 The access to the inner, qualitative reality is only possible by a sort of participation,
“direct acquaintance” or immediate experience of the proper or of an alien psychic life
and not by rational, conceptual reconstruction.
40 Connected  with  his  idea  of  the  inner  intentionality  or  immanent  orientation  of  the
stream of thought James has developed a conception of the physical environment of the
consciousness and the relation to other minds. The thing-as-such was re-(ob)-jected to the
environment in order to preserve the integrity of the unbroken connectivity of thoughts.
The selfhood or personality of the stream of thought gives an additional complexity to
our reading of James’s pluralism: the other minds are also part of the environment of the
psychic system. This is due to the fact that the reference to the consciousness is always
reference to an intimate, individuated flow and the psychic systems are always split in
individuated flows. Other flows of consciousness belong to a non-original, non-intimate
given. If the access to other minds is mediated by the animated body of the others it
emerges always as a symbolic, indirect reference through the analogical imagination, as
also Husserl pointed out.26
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41 The correspondence of the “mine” and of “yours” perceptual conceptions of the “things”
or events is always tuned by mutual confirmation and the common reference to objects is
frequently associated to the spatial location of the thing or event towards the organic
bodies.  The  subject  matter  James  didn’t  scrutinize  was  the  relation  of  the  common
reference  of  the  multiple  individuated  conceptions  of  the  real  to  language  and  to
communication.27 This lack leads, in the following remarks, to the recognition of the need
for integration of  the analogical  imaginary projections of  the “mine” and “yours” in
language and communication.
42 Firstly, the habit to combine the immediate flow of consciousness and the stream of time
in a unique course simply derives from the impossibility to have an intuition of time with
no contents of consciousness, with no qualities of the experience.
43 Secondly, the continuity of the stream is made of sometimes imperceptible conscious and
unconscious reflexive loops connecting memories, actual states and projections. In the
conscious life, even the distinction between past and present entails reflexion. The virtual
/ actuality distinction in the conscious life  refers to a  difference in complex virtual,
imaginary re-entries.
44 Thirdly, the reflexive loops entering in the penumbral regions of the consciousness are
similar to knotting points that work through dissimilar time strata in order to ensure the
integrity of conscious life but not the continuity of time. The understanding of the way the
loops work will lead us to a multilevel notion of time and consciousness, this one made of
multiple  streams  and  meta-streams  (imaginary  streams,  virtual  fluxes  and  fluxes
representing fluxes) as an integration of the linear temporal succession (figured in the
“arrow of time”) and imaginary recursions of impressions and qualities of the experience.
45 Lastly, in the reflexive, symbolical, internal relations of streams and meta-streams one
can’t recognize parts standing to other parts as a representation towards an original or a
teleological orientation of the virtual parts of the stream to perceptual fulfilments. This
means that one can avoid the representational view of the understanding of the linkages
within the conscious life without forcefully have to support the monolinear flow of time
and consciousness. But the end of a flow has only compulsory value for the consciousness
if one associates this stop with communicative events. Nothing in the immanent flow
alone can stop its infinite virtual loop.
 
III. Communication
III.1. Peirce’s Transformation of the Concept of Representation
Through the Sign-Relations
46 These critical remarks28 will lead me now to C. S. Peirce’s notion of thought as symbolic
activity in order to evaluate if the semiotic examination of the process of thought is a
better candidate to the critique of the traditional concept of representation.29 Regarding
my last critical remarks on the monolinear flow of time and consciousness, if Peirce’s
analogy of thought as a sign is true, then the “stream of thought” must be a reflexive
internal loop only momentarily adhering to the so-called flow of time.
47 Observations on “representation” are documented in the seminal text On a New List of
Categories (1868), based on a quasi-kantian double deduction of the categories from the
judgements and the judgments from the acts of reduction to the unity of the multiplicity
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of  the  conscious  content.  Here,  Peirce  started  with  the  psychological  mechanism of
attention, as “denotative power of the mind,” to illustrate the operations of the mental
life analogous of the diairesis and synderesis in propositions. This denotative power of the
mind is  turned to  the  flow of  ideas  and impressions and here  it  isolates  something
immediately present to the consciousness, that Peirce calls substance.30
48 In the investigation of the sources of the categories, the text distinguishes three internal
references  in  the  formation  of  judgments  or  in  the  application  of  predicates  to  the
substances  by the mediation of  the  copula  or  being:  the  reference to  a  ground,  to  a
correlate and the reference to an interpretant. The analysis of the three internal references
joins  psychological,  logical  and  semiotic  aspects.  The  concept  of  representation  is
reserved to the general conceptions of the mind which can originate judgements, in a
sense similar to Kant. Conceptions can be incomplete or complete. They are incomplete if
they don’t include the three references, but only one or two. They are complete whenever
for  the  formation  of  the  conception  the  reference  to  the  interpretant  is  included.
Likeness, Indices (or Signs) and Symbols are representations resulting from the reference
to a ground (quality), to a correlate (by contrast and comparison) and to an interpretant
(or mediating representation), correspondingly.
49 By recognizing the validity of the medieval definition of Logic as the study of “second
intentions” and identifying second intentions with the concepts of the understanding and
the primary intentions with the objects, Peirce further characterized second intentions as
“the objects of the understanding considered as representations.” But he adds that such
objects must be complete representations and not only icons or indices of their objects. In
order to be complete representations they must include the interpretants. As complete
representations all  “second intentions” are symbols.  From this  conclusion comes the
definition of Logic as the study of symbols and the triadic division of symbols in terms,
propositions  and  arguments.  The  importance  of  the  interpretant  in  the  symbolic
representation is evident. Thus, the conventional notion of representation was almost
limited to icons and indices.
50 If Peirce’s enlarged notion of representation is true one must apply the consequences of
such enlargement to the total depth of the doctrines of categories which implies the
psychological the logical, the semiotic and the ontological levels.
51 The 1868 text is not unequivocal concerning the definition of interpretant. Sometimes, it
takes  as  a  valid  definition  the  equivalence  between  interpretant  and  translator.
According  to  the  best  proposal  of  definition,  an  interpretant  is  a  mediating
representation which represents the relate to be a representation of the same correlate
which this mediating representation itself represents (1.553). The exemplification that
follows  this  definition  in  the  text  shows  that  Peirce  intended  with  this  “mediating
representation”  a  thought  operation  that  connects  the  object  of  a  conception,  the
expression of the conception and the effect it produces in the mind(s). The equivalence
between interpretant and translator as “mediating representation” is comprehensible if
one remembers that the translator-interpretant is the responsible for the establishment
of the identity of two different linguistic expressions of the same object in the mind.
Thus, it is the translator the responsible for the causation of the identity or resemblance
by mediating the linguistic difference.
52 The further  evolution of  the  concept  reveals  even more  the  decisive  aspect  of  such
causality. The definition of representation follows: A representation is that character of a
thing by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental effect, it may stand in
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place of  another thing.  The thing having this character I  term a representamen,  the
mental effect, or thought, its interpretant, the thing for which it stands, its object (1.564).
31
53 In On a New List of Categories was suggested the conceptual frame and terminology of the
later work on semiotics in the Correspondence with Lady Welby, but here the division of
the categorial space in Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness is achieved and mature.
54 In a way somewhat familiar to the late Wittgenstein and insisting in the triadic source of
a complete deduction of categories, including the semiotic level of the analysis of signs, in
his  Questions  concerning  certain  Faculties  claimed  for  Man  (1868)  Peirce  examined  the
question of the existence of thought without signs. His analysis led to the conclusion that
“The only thought, then, which can possibly be cognized is thought in signs. But thought
which cannot be cognized does not exist” (5. 251).32
55 This means that the process of cognition entails a self-reflexive movement and doesn’t
coincide with the immediate, irreflexive, monolinear, temporal flow of consciousness or
with the immediacy of the content of the inner experience.
56 On the other hand, the reductionist habit to reduce signs to the thought and the thought
to the object (of perceptual content or intuition) is a consequence of the fear of a regressio
ad infinitum in the process of the internal associations of the signs, as Peirce showed in his
critique of Cartesian intuitionism.
57 But, Peirce kept the concept of representation.
58 Indeed, another justification for the non-reductionist thesis he also adduces lies on the
fact that there is not a proper idea of thought without a notion of what it represents. He
uses the concept of representation positively, as meaning the essential characteristic of
the cognizing process. Because thought which cannot be cognized does not exist one needs to
acknowledge the cognition as a process of meaning-donation of the thought. Thought is a
process of self-enchainment where it is impossible to discover ultimate sources outside
the flow.  Such meaning-donation means representation through symbolic  nexus in a
cyclical chain. Sometimes, the symbolic nexus is also called “representation.” However,
with  this  word  is  meant  the  internal  reference  linking  representamen,  object  and 
interpretant and not a reproduction of a given fact, “thing” or intuition.
59 This is clarified in the answer to Question 7 of Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed
for  Man  where  Peirce  declares  ungrounded the  belief  in  ultimate  foundations  of  the
enchainment of the thought and meaning-donation.33 His answer to this question means
that the use of the grammar of causation in the relation of thought to its underpinnings is
limited. We should use a model of a circular causation instead of the fiction of ultimate
foundations. In his arguments, the critique of the causation of the flow of thought joins
the  idea  that  all  the  process  of  thinking  supposes  relations  and  is  donated  within
relations: “[…] we know of no power by which an intuition could be known. For, as the
cognition is beginning, and therefore in a state of change, at only the first instant would
it be intuition. And, therefore, the apprehension of it must take place in no time and be
an event occupying no time. Besides, all the cognitive faculties we know are relative, and
consequently their products are relations. But the cognition of a relation is determined
by previous cognitions. No cognition not determined by a previous cognition, then, can
be known” (5. 262).
60 The reference to the relation of cognition to previous cognitions in a chain is not far from
Bergson durée or James “stream.” The distinct character of Peirce’s enchainment lies on
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its symbolic-semiotic structure. The character of symbolic linkage of the thought-stream
was developed along the pragmatic critique of the Cartesian intuitionism in The fixation of
Belief (1877) and How to make our ideas clear (1878), as an aspect in the construction of the
doctrine of the three categories.  Additionally,  the maturity of Peirce’s critique of the
prestige of the “clara et distinta perceptio” in 1877 and 1878 agrees with the formation of
his theories on the scientific enquiry, the psychology of belief, the doctrine of the logical
inference grounded on signs-relations and also the conviction of the identity of thought
and sign-activity. These achievements constitute a system.
61 His notion of the role of the representations in mental life is never isolated from his
understanding  of  the  role  of  representations  in  the  scientific  endeavour  or  in  the
scientific ways to develop inferences which are communicative processes not reducible to
mental states.
62 From the  development  of  the  theory  of  categories  resulted  the  conclusion  that  the
conception of what is entails a progressive determination of thought in an endless course,
situated between the two extremities of the indeterminate firstness and the rules or laws
for the recognition of the thought process itself, according to the thirdness. The secondness
is defined by the actuality of action and reaction and it is identical with the sufficient
maturity of thought to construct a fact. For that reason, Peirce wrote in A Guess at Riddle:
It  seems,  then,  that  the  true  categories  of  consciousness  are:  first,  feeling,  the
consciousness which can be included with an instant of time, passive consciousness of
quality, without recognition or analysis; second, consciousness of an interruption into the
field of  consciousness,  sense of  resistance,  of  an external  fact,  of  another something;
third, synthetic conscious- ness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought (1.377).
34
 
III.2. What is an Inference?
63 In  1869,  in  Grounds  of  Validity  of  the  Laws  of  Logic:  Further  Consequences  of  Four
Incapacities continuing ideas from two other texts published in the Journal of Speculative
Philosophy  –  Questions  Concerning  Certain  Faculties  Claimed  for  Man  and  Some
Consequences of Four Incapacities (both from 1868) – Peirce suggested the figure of the
absolute  sceptic,  unable  to  justify  any  sentence  or  belief,  in  order  to  establish  his
refutation of scepticism, the impossibility of an absolute beginning and his thesis that
every judgement results from (previous) inference (stock of knowledge). Every inference
accepts to be re- created in the syllogism: every S is M; M is P; then S is P. Such form is the
habitual  ground  for  ratiocination  in  everyday  life  producing  a  continuous  chain  of
conceptions.  This  means  that  what  is  valid  as  real  must  have  the  characteristic  of
something engendered in a cognitive running process. From these assertions follow three
main consequences: i) [...] real things are of a cognitive and therefore significative nature
[...]; ii) to predicate something of another thing is equivalent to say that the first is a sign
of the other; iii) cognition is a process of semiotic nature.
64 In the Logic of 1873 one may follow the essay to define inference in the scientific en- quiry
from its grounding elements: ideas born from observations, formation of ideas through
other ideas, development of ideas through inferential previous streams more complex.
Peirce never isolates an inference from communicative connections.35 Psychic inferences
of thought are thus mixed with communicative based inferences. On the other hand, the
hypothetical nature of science explains that the inferences are never dead conclusions
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but  prospective  and  conditional  ways  of  disposing  the  known  subjects.36 Disciplined
inferences are methods. The convenience of the treatment of inferences as methods in
the scientific  enquiry  is  related to  the creative  orientation of  the  inferential  stream
towards the hypothetical (heuristic) activity of Science.
65 The  requirement  of  self-sufficiency  of  the  Cartesian  intuitions  limits  the  “clear  and
distinct perception” and the justified knowledge to a few moments in the psychic life and
contradicts  the  continuity  of  the  knowledge  claimed  for  the  scientific  enquiry  and
common-sense  through  the  illuminating  power  of  guiding  hypothesis  or  guessing.37
According to the article Logic (1873) and against Cartesianism, the normal movement of
the  scientific  enquiry consists  in  a  development  from some  temporary  proto-beliefs
which are general ideas able to start the inferential processes. Examples of proto-beliefs
are  the  sensation  and the  observation.  In  the  process  of  the  scientific  enquiry  only
observations are “real” inferential moments. Sensation is a starting point and a testimony
of novelty in the thinking run but by itself it is not an inference. What Peirce calls the
“final  belief” is  the consequence of this inferential  process of  fixation of the general
opinion combining sensations and observations. In the case of the scientific enquiry the
general opinion is not a solipsistic state of mind, but a consequence of a cooperative work
in the formation of meaning and the cause of the general belief  in a “community of
research.”  This  means  that  the  philosopher  gave  to  communication  and  not  to
consciousness,  alone,  the  final  responsibility  for  the  formation of  the  belief  and the
construction of the Reality.38
66 From Peirce’s writings we have no further explanation for the convergence of the psychic
inferences and the communicative processing of meaning and information. We have to
presuppose this convergence as already established. Thus, the heterogeneous character
or  relative autonomy of  the conscious  running of  the inferences,  with its  ground in
emotion and volition, and the communicative running of arguments and information-
transmission was not emphasized. However, we know that the faith in the immediate
connection of the stream of consciousness and communication would be pure ingenuity.
Peirce  didn’t  give  an  adequate  description  of  the  enchainment  of  consciousness  in
communication and vice-versa. This remains a problem.
67 Certainly, the philosopher inverted the classical scheme of the representation and instead
of conceiving the sign as a double of the thought-thing relation he took the sign as an
activity characteristic of the thinking process itself, according to the famous definition of
semiosis in Survey of Pragmatism: “By semiosis I mean […] an action, or influence, which is,
or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant,
this three-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs”
(5.484).
68 However,  Peirce didn’t realize that consciousness and communication are two relative
independent sources of meaning generation.39 Both participate in meaning, but through
dif- ferent forms. The abstraction of the problem of the relative opacity of the psychic
forms towards the communicative forms (and vice-versa) is reflected in the difficulty to
realize  how  the  final  interpretants  or  the  community’s  beliefs  influence  the  actual
running of  a  psy-  chological  experience  in  the  individuals.  This  “influence”  remains
hypothetical or “regula- tive” in the Kantian sense.40
69 Former developments on the doctrine of  categories  from the years  1867,  1890,  1894,
1896-189741 and the formulas of the sketches for the Lowell Lectures (1903),42 Lectures II
and III, concerning the critique of the “nominalism” of modern Philosophy; the need for a
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recognition of “three types of Being” and three categories and here the regulative power
of the “universals” (or generality) as “laws” concerning our representation of the future
phenomena; the preparatory studies for the “existential graphs” entailing a concept of
individuation, relation, possibility and necessity and the studies on abduction constitute
the germinal material for Peirce’s understanding of semiosis as a universal component of
Being in general and for his own semiotic transformation of Pragmat(ic)ism.
70 In  the  formulation  of  the  theory  of  the  “three  universes”  contained  in  the
Correspondence with Lady Welby (December, 14, 1908), and before another essay of a
trichotomy of  the sign-types,  Peirce outlined a  sketch of  the embryonic  three triads
articulating the reality-thought-sign combinations.
 
Figure 2
71 The resulting diagram represents the structure of the sign along the Representamen (R),
Object (O) and Interpretant (I) links, with divisions occurring from its relative positions in
the categories of the firstness, secondness and thirdness: Oi, Od, Ii, Id and If. The object
(O)  of  the  sign  is  divided  in  the  types  of  the  immediate  (firstness)  and  dynamic
(secondness); the Interpretant in immediate (firstness), dynamic (secondness) and final
(thirdness). The Representament is not subject to divisions, because it coincides with the
potentiality, typical of the firstness.
72 If Peirce’s analogy of Man with a Sign stands for a radical, unrestricted, pan-semiotic
model  for  the  understanding  of  biological,  psychic  and  communicative  processes,  it
would contend with James’s pluralism and the principle of the selfhood, intimacy and
individuality of the psychic stream of consciousness and, additionally, it would violate the
borders between biological, psychic and social systems. If this last conclusion was not the
intended result of Peirce’s analogy, even if some Peirce’s texts point to a pan-semiotic
model of this kind, one must harmonize the semiotic model with an internal pluralism of
levels which will lead to the recognition of systemic autonomies. Such proposal demands
a combination of semiotic and systemic models. According to this systemic and plural
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semiotic approach James’s descriptions of the stream of consciousness would correspond
to the psychic system with its  own closure and borders formations and his  claim to
pluralism regains sense.
 
III.3. The Double Environment Hypothesis and the Meaning of
Modelling Systems
73 If Peirce’s semiosis supposes a complete communicative dimension and not only a lin-
guistic comprehension of the use of symbols, this means that it is only by communication
and not by language alone that one is able to follow the formation of some important
systemic borders. A triple distinction of consciousness, language and communication is
needed.  For  example,  the  distinction  between  the  physical,  exterior  thing  and  the
psychological object is only completed with the supposition of a public space-time system
of  coordinates  which  is  only  available  through  communicative  sources.  But
communication is autonomous from the psychological formation of meaning in a great
variety of modes.
74 Modern Society is an evolutionary demonstration of such progressive autonomy of the
communicative emergence of meaning towards the “Psyché.”
75 Inspired in the advances of Biosemiotics and in the writings of Y. Lotman and the Tartu
School, the deepening of the concept of modelling systems led T. A. Sebeok to an enlarged
notion  of  the  modelling  capabilities  in  systems  subject  to  evolution,  such  as  living
systems, psychic systems and what he calls “cultural systems.”43
76 Modelling  systems44 are  enclosed  spaces  of  semiotic  and  cognitive  nature  providing
mappings of the world, adaptation responses to the environments, as “ecological niches,”
schemes for the processing of signalling information and the selection of patterns of
behaviour  appropriate  to  the  circumstances  of  action  or  movement.  The  ability  to
develop  models  evolves  from  the  basic  organisms45 as  pre-verbal  and  pre-linguistic
mapping and adaptation to the complex images of the world of Science, Philosophy and
Literature passing through the linguistic modelling systems. All these stages are partially
related  to  representation,  but  with  “representation”  one  doesn’t  mean  passive
reproduction of something given but mapping, selection, adaptation and coordination
schemes. Further, a model is a congruent, self-referential set of schemes to anticipate and
control  the  relation  of  cognitive  orientations  and  action  in  complex  organisms.
Consequently,  modelling  is  not  an  exclusive  characteristic  of  the  cognising  psychic
systems but occurs in biological, psychic and communication-based systems.46 According
to  T. Sebeok’s  correction  to  Y. Lotman’s  concept  of  “secondary  modelling  systems,”
biological systems are the true primary modelling systems instead of linguistic systems
which are secondary systems and “culture” and “cultural texts” are tertiary modelling
systems.47 The criteria for primary, secondary or tertiary modelling systems depends on
the  degrees  of  increasing  presupposition  of  the  relevant  environments.  The  tertiary
modelling systems suppose the modelling results of the secondary systems.
77 Regarding  the  tertiary  systems,  I  would  prefer  the  concept  of  systems  based  on
communication instead of “cultural systems,” in virtue of our thesis about the distinction
between the communicative forms of meaning and the psychic forms of meaning.
78 I would like to emphasise now that psychic systems and systems based on communication
are parts of this integrative view of the “modelling systems.” Both constitute models of
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the physical and biological environments and are models for each other, reciprocally.
Each of them is the environment of the other. Language is an evolutionary tool for the
accommodation  of  consciousness  to  the  requirements  of  the  participation  in
communication.48 But language doesn’t destruct the systemic autonomy of both systems,
rather it presupposes such independence.
79 The hypothesis  of  a  double  or  reciprocal  environment  supposes  that  meaning is  the
common element of both systems. What defines meaning is a minimal distinction that
recurs in psychic life and in communication: the difference between actuality and potentiality.
80 W. James was aware of this basic oppositional repetitive relation at the foundations of the
psychic processes of association, attention or, more generally speaking, of selection. The
distinction also occurs in time, or we can interpret time as a universal generalization of
the distinction of actuality and potentiality. However, the form of time is more universal
than the forms of meaning in psychic or communicative systems.
81 Through the organic body the psychic system ensures a continuous contact with the
physical and organic environment. Communication and communicative systems suppose
the bodily coordination of the psychic systems towards their environments but the out-
comes  of  communication  are  only  significant  for  psychic  systems  or  consciousness,
because only psychic systems are able to decode communicative outcomes in their own
elements, or thoughts. On the other hand, communication supposes the formation of the
physical environment as an objective sphere regarding the “field of consciousness” which
partially  results  from the closure  of  consciousness  itself.  The double  environment  is
structured  on  the  basis  of  a  plurality  of  modelling  schemes:  biological,  psychic  and
communicative.  This  multilevel  architecture is  worth of  an autonomous analysis  and
remains a productive land for a multilinear Semiotic, refusing the abstraction of a naïve
homogeneous model.49
82 Instead of conceiving representation as a doubling of the external being and a figurative
passage between a physical state and a psychic replica the semiotic ideas of modelling
and modelling systems consider the cognitive act of referring as a creation of the activity
of modelling environments. What counts as the cognitive reference of a system shall be
traced through the dividing border of the system, as its outer space. Such activity of
drawing borders is one of semiotic nature because it is structured by the R-O-I relations.
It is also systemic because gives to the object of the cognitive act of referring the status of
an element in the environment of the system. Finally, it is evolutionary because supposes
that the limits dividing system and environment are relative, contingent and evolve.
83 The adaptation of Peirce’s gerative semiotic R-O-I model and his idea of semiosis as an
endless process to the style of  the systemic description made clear that the physical
reality of the objects exterior to the mind is not the unique available environment, but
one may conceive  environments  constituted by psychic  or  organic  events  and many
others. Biological events or psychic streams may be parts of the environment of a system.
This depends on which system is taken as reference. If one assumes that communication
makes a self-reproducing cycle of connected elements distinct from consciousness and
from the biological units, because in communication there is a connection of elements
autonomous from the elements connected in the psychic stream of consciousness or in
the self-reproduction of  the living,  then one faces the relation of  communication to
consciousness  or  to  the  organic  events  as  a  typical  relation of  a  system towards  its
environment.
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84 James’s and Peirce’s approaches to pragmatism are so different in many aspects because
they started from different systemic perspectives concerning the modelling activity and
both believed in the universality of their own limited theoretical reconstructions of the
partial modelling systems. The importance Peirce gave to the community in the endless
formation of the “final beliefs,” which are quasi identical with the final interpretants,
clearly  resulted  from  a  communicative  bias  in  the  understanding  of  the  modelling
activity. On the other hand, James’s quasi phenomenological description of the “field of
consciousness” is a remarkable picture of the closure of the psychic systems coupled with
the organic bodies, modelling the physical, external object or physical environment.
85 My proposal has an ontological depth. “What is” consists of the contingent outcome of
overlapping environments: it is not a definite state in the world, a mental image or a
communicative  result  of  an  endless  communication  process, but  the  overlapping  of
multiple modelling sources starting with the living mapping of the ecological niche until
the  conditional  couplings  of  psychic  and  communicative  modelling.  This  perspective
gives an additional support to James’s pluralism and multiverse.
86 The  programme  of  a  multilinear  Semiotics  implies  a  non-reductionist  concept  of
reference, beginning with the constitutive couple of self-reference and hetero-reference that
emerges when a system closes its own borders regarding its environments. The question
of the generation of systemic borders is similar to the problem of the determination of
“what  is”  real  in  a  particular  course  of  learning  and  adaptation  and  is  therefore  a
question born in the cradle of Pragmatism and Peirce’s Semiotics. But according to our
multilinear programme evolution doesn’t  mean an overall  uniform result,  but entails
differences in evolutionary stages and time discrepancies between the systems and the
environments.
87 In order to know what is “real” one needs to know what reference-frames were settled to
establish the difference between the reference framework, or “model”, and what is going
to be revealed through it. The R→O→I basic semiotic elements could be taken here as the
elements of a gerative sequence of the emergence of the referential capability of systemic
borders (self- and hetero-references).
88 On the division border between system (S) and environment (E) are closely associated
three aspects of the semiosis: i) the distinction itself (S/E), like a separation between two
“domains” – system and “world”; ii) the indication/signalling through which, thanks to a
given operation, one of these domains may stand “in place of another”, thus generating
the  familiarity  I  have  been  commenting  between  representation  and  meaning  and,
finally, iii) an enchainment of operations and codifications to rule the repetition of the
former  distinction  (S/E).  These  three  aspects  reiterate  in  the  gerative  systemic
terminology the semiotic distinction between R→O→I. If the system refers to more than
one environment, the three aspects must be applied to each of them.
89 The border between the system and the environment (S/E), the structuring difference
between  both  domains,  is  situated  at  the  level  of  the  differential  couples  of  the
continuous/discontinuous and fusion/separation and can cause the enchainment of semiotic
codes and operations sustaining or reinforcing meaning through repetition. In systems,
the self-enchainment of operations (or elements) can be identified along the evolution as
the possibility of repetition of the structural arrangement of a particular organism or
machine. In order to reproduce the separation of the system regarding its environment
(S/E) is required the repetition of the original distinction which is reinforced through the
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evolutionary perception of  identity of  the same.  Thus,  sameness is  obtained through
repetition of a distinction (S/E) that recurs inside itself in virtue of an observation. This
means the evolutionary attainment of self-reference.
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NOTES
1. W.  James  relationship  with  C.  Renouvier  is  attested  in  many  texts,  including  A  Pluralistic
Universe and the Letters. See for example W. James 2008: Appendix B, p. 233, n.24; W. James 1920:
vol. I, p. 163-4; 206-7 (here James refers a course he gave on the subject of C. Renouvier’s Essais),
W. James 1920: vol. II, p. 44 ff.
2. “Les choses en tant que représentations, conformément à ce que je viens d’exposer,  je les
nomme des faits ou des phénomènes. Ainsi j’arrive à définir la chose par la représentation après
avoir  défini  la  représentation  par  la  chose;  et  ce  cercle  est  inévitable;  et  les  deux  mots
représentation et chose, d’abord distingués, viennent se confondre en un troisième: phenomena”
(Renouvier 1854: 7).
3. Renouvier (1854: 24).
4. “La connaissance ne reçoit point de représenté sans représentatif, point de représentatif sans
représenté,  et  c’est  dans  une  représentation  qu’elle  reçoit  l’un  et  l’autre  ;  ailleurs  jamais”
(Renouvier 1854: 24-5).
5. Mach (1886: 8).
6. James (2008: 135-66).
7. Bergson (1907: 72).
8. James (2009: 20).
9. James (2009: 21).
10. James (2009: 22).
11. James (2009: 21).
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12. See the remarks about “the proper use of the term Object in Psychology” in James (1950: I,
275).
13. James (1950: I, 276-7).
14. See the illustration of the time of the “stream of thought” in James (1950: I, 279).
15. James (1950: I, 254-5).
16. James (1950: I, 242-3).
17. “The ubiquity of the distinctions, this and that, here and there, now and then, in our minds is
the result of our laying the same selective emphasis on parts of place and time. But we do far
more than emphasize things, and unite some and keep others apart. We actually ignore most of
the things before us […] To begin at the bottom, what are our very senses themselves but organs
of selection?” (James 1950: I, 284).
18. James (1950: I, 285).
19. F. H. Bradley (1893: 25).
20. F. H. Bradley (1893: 31).
21. F. H. Bradley (1893: 32).
22. J. Royce (1900: Lecture VIII).
23. Id., Ibid.
24. James (2008: 126).
25. James (2008: 128-9).
26. For a synthetic view combining aspects of the doctrine of the intersubjective constitution of
the  “social  order”  of  the  Husserlian  Phenomenology  and  William  James’s  concept  of
consciousness see: Schutz 1962. Compare also with Gurwitsch 1964.
27. This  was  the  point  of  departure  of  A. Schutz’s  research,  partially  connected  to  James’s
Psychology. Due to his debt to E. Husserl’s Phenomenology and M. Weber’s Sociology, Schutz’s
analyses of communication in society are subordinated to the methodological arch relating the
subject, the action and the shared symbols. Compare Schutz & Luckmann (1973: 148 ff.). Here, the
connection with G. H. Mead’s Mind, Self, and Society is evident.
28. With the concept of communication used along this text it is not meant an intersubjective
intercourse of  words between human beings.  The concept is  used with a larger meaning.  By
communication I mean a production of meaning effects that transcend the consciousness of the
individuals  and  may  have  its  source,  dissemination  and  impact  outside  psychic  systems  or
psychic environments. Additionally, the idea of a self-catalyzed system of communication comes
from the work of N. Luhmann. See Luhmann 2001.
29. Some aspects of the research about the impact of Peirce’s concept of sign and semeiosis in the
World-image of  the  traditional  Metaphysics  were  developed by  K.-O. Apel  (1973:  157-77)  and
L. Honnefelder 1990. Summarizing many readings of Peirce, see Ketner (1995: 315 ff.).
30. The Kantian influence was decisive in the years of the formation of the first sketches of the
categories.  In the text On a New List of  Categories,  a category was the conceptual result of the
reduction of the multiplicity of the sensorial experience, also reflected in the different types of
judgements. At the surface, Peirce’s idea of a new deduction of categories continues what Kant
called metaphysical deduction of the categories. However, Peirce was aware of the need for a special
analysis of the signs implied in the judgements. Later, in the Lectures on Pragmatism, Lecture II, 
Peirce  used  the  concept  of  “Phenomenology”  to  denote  the  discipline  responsible  for  the
examination  of  “the  faculty  of  seeing.”  See  5.43.  Under  mixed  presuppositions  and  new
interpretations of a “science of ideas” or conceptions the philosopher recurred also to the words
“Ideoscopy,” in the Letters to Lady Welby (8.328), and “Phaneroscopy” (1.317-21; “The Basis of
Pragmaticism in Phaneroscopy” in C. S. Peirce, N. Houser 1998: 360 ff.). See also W. L. Rosensohn
1993.
31. References to C. S. Peirce’s Collected Papers will be along the text. The numbers refer volume
and paragraph in the Harvard edition.
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32. The answer to Question 5 “Whether we can think without signs” is given in 5.251 as following:
If we seek the light of external facts, the only cases of thought which we can find are of thought
in signs. Plainly, no other thought can be evidenced by external facts. But we have seen that only
by external facts can thought be known at all. The only thought, then, which can possible be
cognized is thought in signs. But thought which cannot be cognized does not exist. All thought,
therefore, must necessarily be in signs (5. 251).
33. “Question 7 ‘Whether there is any cognition not determined by a previous cognition’ […] For
something entirely out of consciousness which may supposed to determine it, can, as such, only
be known and only adduced in the determinate cognition in question. So, that to suppose that a
cognition is determined solely by something absolutely external, is to suppose its determinations
incapable of explanation. Now, this is a hypothesis which is warranted under no circumstances,
inasmuch as the only possible justification for a hypothesis is that it explains the facts, and to say
that they are explained and at the same time to suppose them inexplicable is self-contradictory”
(5. 260).
34. Earlier, in Consequences of four Incapacities he declared about the way in which the ideas return
to a “first” beginning, less vivid than the actuality: “[…] These in their term have been derived
from others still less general, less distinct, and less vivid; and so on back to the ideal first, which
is quite singular, and quite of consciousness. This ideal first is the particular thing-in-itself. It
does not exist as such” (5. 311).
35. “Some thoughts are produced by previous thoughts according to regular laws of association,
so that if  the previous thoughts be known, and the rule of association be given, the thought
which is so produced may be pre- dicted. This is the elaborative operation of thought, or thinking
par excellence. But when an idea comes up in the mind which has no such relation to former
ideas, but is something new to us, we say that it is caused by something out of mind, and we call
the process by which such thoughts spring up, sensation. And those parts of investigation which
consist chiefly in supplying such materials for thought to work over, combine and analyze, are
termed observations” (7. 328) “[…] But observations alone cannot constitute investigation […]
Accordingly, besides observation it must be that there is also an elaborative process of thought
by which the ideas given by observation produce others in the mind” (7.331).
36. A consequence of the postulation of the “final belief” in the actual efforts to build knowledge
is the ideal character of a community of research which operates in a way similar to a hypothesis
in the heuristic drive of science: “Hypothesis is where we find some very curious circumstance,
which would be explained by the supposition that it was a case of a certain general rule, and
therefore adopt that supposition” (2.524).
37. The constitution of the continuity of knowledge through hypothetic guessing is especially
emphasized in the fragment manuscript entitled Guessing. Here Peirce shows the power of the
“generals” or universals in the formation of the “art of inquiry” (7.47),  but also the value of
vagueness.
38. In Consequences of Four Incapacities Peirce wrote: “The real, then, is that which, sooner or later,
information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the
vagaries  of  me  and  you.  Thus,  the  very  origin  of  the  conception  of  reality  shows  that  this
conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable
of a definite increase of knowledge” (5.316-5.317).
39. The homogeneous medium attributed to the sign-thought couple is emphasized through the
endless connectivity of its elements: “From the proposition that every thought is a sign, it follows that
every thought must address itself to some other, must determine some other, since that is the essence of a
sign” (5. 253).
40. The diagrams linking the three categories of firtsness,  secondness and thirdness and the
three components of semiosis, with its further divisions, makes clear that Peirce intends with his
semiotic concept of thought a new idea of representation without rejecting the homogeneous
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medium of the ancient, medieval and modern Theory of Being as the ground for the modi essendi, 
cognoscendi  and  communicandi.  Peirce  used  the  kantian  concept  of  “regulative  principles”  to
describe the power of the representation of the future in the orientation in the present as a
“logical principle” in the Notebook of the Lowell Lectures. See manuscript numbered MS 462, p.
25 Archive images, captured at Harvard 1994, by M. Keeler under NSF grant. Stored on DAT and
transferred to the University of Washington in 1997. Archived on 1/98 at CARTAH, by M.Keeler
on  6  CDs;  CDs  1-5  ISO9660,  CD  6  HFS.  Towards  the same  direction  goes  his  conception  of
abduction in 2.270.
41. See E. Balsemão Pires (1993: 117-8).
42. Compare with the Manuscripts numbered MSS 460, MSS 462 and MSS 464. Archive images,
captured at Harvard 1994, by M. Keeler under NSF grant. Stored on DAT and transferred to the
University of Washington in 1997. Archived on 1/98 at CARTAH, by M.Keeler on 6 CDs; CDs 1-5
ISO9660, CD 6 HFS.
43. Compare: Sebeok 2001; Sebeok 1994; Johansen & Larsen 2002; Petrelli & Ponzio 2008.
44. See: Lotman 2001; Lotman & Ouspenski 1976; Bains 2001; Deeley 2004; Nöth 2006.
45. Here the reference to the work of biologist J. von Uexküll and his concept of the biological
Umwelt of the organisms is important. Compare: J. von Uexküll 1956; T. von Uexküll 1999; Barbieri
2008.
46. See Battail 2009.
47. Sebeok (1994: 139-49).
48. According to Luhmann (2001: 120-1).
49. The image of an “Architectonics of Semiosis” in an essay of E. Taborsky 1998 is seductive,
because  in  the  book  the  author  tries  to  develop  the  idea  of  “semiotic  complexity,  ongoing
diversification” (Taborsky 1998: 16) or “stages of increasing complexity of cognition” (Taborsky
1998: 114). But, a real diversification of semiosis demands the previous clarification of systemic
individuation and constitution of meaning frontiers between systems and environments.
ABSTRACTS
The pragmatist turn in Philosophy in the late XIX century and XX century was a serious attempt
to refuse the privilege of the representational elements of the conscious- ness in the production
of knowledge. Such privilege has its roots in Ancient Philosophy, in some consequences of the
Platonic  heritage,  but  was  toughened  by  Modern  philosophers  of  empiricist  or  aprioristic
lineages  within  the  modern  concepts  of  Experience  and  Truth.  With  these  last  concepts  of
Experience  and  Truth  I’m  referring  to  the  objectivising  tendency  that  leads  to  identify
experience with the final object resulting from the judicative fixation of relations. Due to the
fixation of some basic relations the object of experience was identified and conceived with such
and such characteristics as something independent of the mental or judicative activity.  Such
method of fixation and objectivising of relations is also present in the common-sense ideas of
Reality, Experience and Truth.
In the field of the theory of signs the reputation of the modern concept of representation was so
vast that despite the progress in the discovery of the differential character of the linguistic units,
Saussure’s well-known notion of sign and the division between “signifiant” and “signifié” still
kept the reference to the double across the body/mind polarity and to the “mental image” of the
sign, Vorstellung, concept or “signifié,” as the core of meaning. If Peirce and James agree in the
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refusal of the classical theory of representation, their rejection came from different horizons and
their critiques don’t mean the same.
I’ll  try to show that James’s and Peirce’s attempts are not disjunctive,  although they are not
members  of  a  simple  addition.  In  the  writings  of  the  Tartu  School  and  in  T.  Sebeok’s
reassessment to Peircean semeiosis one finds interesting tools to reconsider the relation to the
World of the “field of consciousness” and semeiosic cycles, beyond representationalism, such as
the concepts of environment and primary, secondary and tertiary modelling systems. Starting
with these  insights  I’ll  propose  at  the end of  the essay the notion of  a  double  environment
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